Miro's $1.36B Sale Marks 90% Valuation Reset for Late-Stage SaaS

For public and private market investors, Miro's sale is a stark reminder that late-stage valuations can reset sharply when real cash is on the table. At $600 million in annual recurring revenue, the $1.79 billion equity value implies roughly three times ARR, and after adjusting for Miro's $435 million in net cash, the enterprise multiple drops to about 2.3 times ARR. The transaction shows what disciplined acquirers are now willing to pay for mature SaaS assets.

Bending Spoons has agreed to acquire visual collaboration company Miro for $1.36 billion in cash, a deal that values Miro's equity at $1.79 billion, according to reporting by TechCrunch on September 10, 2026. That price represents a decline of roughly 90% from the $17.5 billion valuation Miro commanded in late 2021, when the company was among the most celebrated beneficiaries of the remote-work boom. The transaction is the latest in a long pattern by Milan-based Bending Spoons of buying once-hot software companies at steep markdowns after their growth has slowed or their funding environment has shifted. Bending Spoons said Miro now generates around $600 million in annual recurring revenue, with 90% of that coming from businesses and enterprises, and that Miro holds about $435 million in net cash.

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At $600 million in annual recurring revenue, the $1.79 billion equity value implies roughly three times ARR, and after adjusting for Miro's $435 million in net cash, the enterprise multiple drops to about 2.3 times ARR.

The company now called Miro was founded in 2011 as RealtimeBoard, a whiteboarding tool. It found explosive adoption when COVID-19 forced companies to move to distributed work and employees increasingly needed digital spaces that could replicate the experience of standing at a physical whiteboard. Miro capitalized on that demand by building a platform that integrates with more than 250 applications and by striking partnerships with Atlassian, Cisco, Microsoft, and Zoom. By 2022, Miro had grown from roughly 5 million to about 30 million total users in about two years, and its paying customer base expanded by 550%. Today, Miro describes itself as an AI innovation workspace, offering AI assistants for whiteboard tools, AI workflows, prototyping tools, and AI connectors that pull context from platforms such as GitHub, Jira, and Slack. The company reports more than 4 million paying users and 100 million total users.

For investors, the most consequential number is not the headline price but the implied revenue multiple. At $600 million in annual recurring revenue, the $1.79 billion equity value equals roughly three times ARR. After subtracting Miro's $435 million in net cash, the enterprise value of approximately $1.355 billion implies about 2.3 times ARR. That is a far cry from the 2021 climate in which software companies with sustained growth could be valued at 20 to 50 times revenue or more. The deal therefore provides a concrete, data-rich benchmark for how far private software valuations have reset when real cash is being exchanged, rather than when valuations are based on mark-to-market estimates or the most recent funding round.

The transaction also matters as a signal about exit alternatives for late-stage private companies. Miro was once viewed as a likely IPO candidate during the post-2020 software boom, but a public listing at the current point in the cycle may not have offered the same certainty as a cash sale. Bending Spoons has established itself as an acquirer willing to pay cash for mature, scaled assets that can be restructured and managed for efficiency. Miro's reported $435 million in net cash means the effective outlay for the operating business is lower than the headline $1.36 billion purchase price. That gives Bending Spoons flexibility, but it also means Miro's investors are selling an asset that was once worth nearly $17.5 billion on paper at a price that reflects the new reality for enterprise software.

One important uncertainty is how the $1.79 billion equity value will be distributed across Miro's cap table. Without details on the company's funding history, liquidation preferences, or common shareholder stakes, the headline decline does not automatically tell us which investors made money, which lost money, or which simply recovered a portion of prior capital. Late-stage investors who entered at the 2021 valuation could face substantial losses, but the exact outcome depends on the structure of earlier rounds and Miro's preferences. The lack of disclosure is typical for private M&A, but it underscores that a 90% valuation markdown does not have uniform consequences for all shareholders.